Building Multilateral Conflict Prevention Capacity in South Asia

As in many parts of the world, in South Asia violent conflict has moved from the inter-State to the intra-State level contributing in some cases to crises of government with a breakdown of law and order and a lack of faith in public institutions. Although ideologies and practices of ethnic accommodation, integration, and peaceful co-existence among multi-ethnic States and regions of South Asia do exist, so too do divisive identity politics. Identity-based politics practiced in ways that discriminate against minority groups and deny equality or exclude are one of many sources of internal strife. Coupled with majoritarian systems of government, this has led many communities to attempt to reaffirm their identity in numerous ways including violence that has progressed to armed conflict in South Asia. Some of these groups fall in the category or are labeled as “terrorists”, with special laws enacted that restrict the rights of citizens instead of dealing with the root causes of conflict.

Existing hierarchies in South Asia disregard principles of non-discrimination, equality and effective participation in public life resulting in the violation of the rights of ethnic, religious and cultural groups, often leading to violent conflict. Hence it is imperative to initiate strategic engagements that challenge, or in the case of quiet diplomacy, persuade these hierarchies to be more accommodating and to respect the rights of groups within their societies and thereby prevent the breakout of violence.

In India, Hinduism as a political force has contributed to the creation of serious communal violence between Hindus and Muslims. In 1999, India saw communal violence in States as widely spread as Bihar and Tamil Nadu. Violence against Muslims in Gujarat and the use of identity politics by the ruling party is contributing to greater insecurity amongst Muslims in India. Violence against Christians too assumed alarming proportions in the latter half of the last decade. In addition, ethnic and regional movements in the states of Punjab, Assam, and Nagaland have challenged the authority of the State by resorting to violent means to achieve their political goals. Caste remains an issue in India with people of “backward” castes denied access to resources, opportunities and services available to the general populace. In the beginning of the 1990’s the caste issue was widely discussed as a result of the adoption of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission regarding reservations for the so-called backward classes, but tensions followed these recommendations.

The minority community in Pakistan, which includes Ahamadis, Hindus and Christians, constitutes a substantial part of the population but is still subject to discrimination and harassment. Their minority status has been institutionalized with separate electoral rolls and restrictions on their right to franchise, which allows them to vote only for candidates of the minority groups to the central and provincial legislatures. This in effect bars their entry into the mainstream political process and thereby limits the impact they might have on the main decision-making process. Similarly, political autonomy is the cause of clashes between Pathans, Mohajirs, Punjabis and Sindhis that have claimed thousands of lives in the past decade.

The fact that many communities in South Asia have “kin-States” in the region heightens the need for early warning and effective conflict prevention. If violent conflict erupts it will adversely affect the dynamics of the relationship between the State in which the community lives and the kin-State with the prospect of spilling over international borders. For example, the Kashmir dispute and divisive identity politics practiced by both India and Pakistan have resulted in the Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India being targeted by the majority in these countries when relations between both countries are strained. The conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, which is the cause of illegal immigration from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to India, led to tense Indo-Bangladesh relations. The nuclearization of the region following nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan, and the ensuing arms race, is another challenge to regional stability.

The obstacles range from the restrictive mandate of SAARC to enmity between member States. SAARC seeks to promote economic and social cooperation while eschewing interference in domestic issues. This effectively means that sources of internal tensions and issues related to ethnic, religious, cultural and minority groups are beyond the scope of SAARC. The history of SAARC shows deep divisions between member countries which do not appear to be committed to the creation of a regional organization with the capacity to deal with substantive issues that affect the region. Many factors exacerbate the lack of co-operation between States, amongst them the different systems of governance in the region ranging from monarchies and military dictatorships to democracies. Even countries that have practiced democracy, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, have not institutionalized democratic norms and practices.

Perceived Indian hegemony is another obstacle that has to be overcome to achieve meaningful regional co-operation. Fear of Indian hegemony has been exhibited at SAARC meetings where other countries have ganged up against India and used SAARC as a platform to air grievances. The improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations therefore is imperative to the success of SAARC. Recent easing of tensions between India and Pakistan and the willingness of both parties to explore a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Kashmir is a positive sign of changing regional dynamics. This change could support the development of conflict prevention institutions in South Asia.

In exploring the possibility of establishing a regional conflict prevention mechanism, especially with regard to inter-ethnic or similar inter-community tensions, the experience of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should be studied, as it is the only example of a successful regional inter-governmental conflict prevention mechanism. While acknowledging the HCNM provides valuable lessons on regional conflict prevention, it seems evident that the South Asian context and SAARC framework is substantially different, and so the same process cannot be expected to be employed to create a similar mechanism in South Asia. In order to create the conditions for the possible development of a similar institutional mechanism, the Program will have to make SAARC member States aware of an important fact recognized by OSCE States which contributed to the success of the HCNM, i.e. that domestic problems relating to minorities and inter-community relations could lead to internal strife which, in time if left un-addressed, can threaten regional peace, stability and development. Unfortunately, at present the contrary view exists in some parts of South Asia as illustrated by the “Godra experiment” in Gujarat, where violence against minorities was used as an election campaigning method by the Bharathiya Janata Party (BJP). Beyond this issue of awareness and perspective (and unlike in the OSCE), SAARC member States are so far not bound by many common principles which would entail such institutional developments. Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs and openings to build upon.

In the case of SAARC, most South Asian countries appear very reluctant to co-operate even in the area of trade. A study of the work of the OSCE HCNM illustrates the High Commissioner’s success was in some cases due in part to the fact that many countries with which he engaged were or are in line for EU or NATO membership and therefore eager to conform to international standards which these organizations hold high. In the absence of similar political processes in South Asia, the Program will have to devise innovative strategies to raise awareness about other interests and overcome obstacles, persuade governments and create circumstances conducive to the establishment of a regional conflict prevention mechanism, and emphasize the value of its potential problem-solving, advisory role in identifying policy responses that benefit all parties concerned.

It should also be noted that, in practice, the HCNM used OSCE and other principles and standards as a basis for his activities, which provided him with standards and frameworks to work within, whereas in South Asia there are no such regional principles or standards. International standards, including treaties ratified by the SAARC member States, will therefore have to form the framework within which the proposed mechanism should work. It needs also to be acknowledged that a large part of the HCNM’s success was due to the personal traits of the first High Commissioner, Mr. Max Van der Stoel, who through his impartiality, independence, integrity, experience and political acumen shaped the post of HCNM into one that earned the respect of even those who did not necessarily agree with the HCNM’s views or recommendations. The success of the mechanism therefore relies heavily on the candidate or – should a group of eminent persons be the desired format – candidates chosen. The OSCE HCNM was appointed through consensus, which meant he had credibility and legitimacy amongst all members of the OSCE. If a similar mechanism is created in South Asia, the appointment of suitable candidates may be the subject of contention and controversy, with countries potentially backing candidates from their own countries for political leverage at the expense of finding the most suitable candidate. Hence, the Program in its lobbying activities should stress the importance of the credibility and regional acceptability of the person(s) ultimately chosen to head the conflict prevention mechanism and encourage non-partisanship in candidate selection.

Therefore, in South Asia while lobbying for the creation of a regional conflict prevention mechanism, the Program should also explore methods to be utilized to overcome the possible obstacles such a mechanism might face due to the shortcomings of the existing regional intergovernmental organization.